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Historically, many states, such as Wyoming, have prohibited the
use of corporate funds in referendum elections. One reason for the prohibition was the fear that a corporation, with its vast resources, might actually dictate the outcome of the election. However, a recent Supreme
Court decision has made it clear that a flat prohibition on corporate expression is unconstitutional. Therefore this article examines the constitutional test which a state must meet in order to regulate the use of corporate funds in elections. It applies the required test to the present
Wyoming statute and makes the appropriate recommendations for
changing the current statute so that it will be constitutionally permissable.

CORPORATE EXPRESSION IN
WYOMING BALLOT ISSUES,
REFERENDA AND INITIATIVES:
A POLITICAL AND
LEGAL DILEMMA*
MargaretMaier Murdock **
J. Nicholas Murdock***
While referenda are certainly not new creations in the
American political system, the use of referenda has. been
given a new life and, perhaps, legitimacy, by the success of
California's Proposition 13.1 The new vitality of referenda
has again opened the question of corporate expression, and
its place in the American system of freedom of expression.
The success of Proposition 13, with its emphasis on control
of governmental spending, may prompt more use of the
Copyright ©c1979 by the University of Wyoming.
*This article was in part financed by a Law and Liberty grant from the Institute for
Humane Studies. Menlo Park, California.
**Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Wyoming - Casper; B.A.
Creighton University, 1970; M.A. 1975, Ph.D., Tufts University (1978).
***Associate, Vlastos and Reeves, P.C.; B.S., Creighton University, 1969; J.D., University of Wyoming. 1977; member of Wyoming and Natrona County Bar Associations.
1. Casper Star-Tribune, June 7, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
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referenda. 2 It is for these reasons that the issue of corporate
expression-its uses and limitations-will be discussed below with regard to participation in referenda.
Historically, the place of corporations in the electoral
process has been a matter which has been much discussed
both by reformers and legal commentators. Fearing that the
vast resources of the corporations might allow corporations
to dominate elections, reformers have called for restrictions
upon the use of corporate funds in elections. 4 In states such
as Wyoming, the use of corporate funds in elections, including initiatives, referenda and other ballot issues has
been prohibited.' Perhaps, in the spirit of fairness, the
Wyoming Legislature has extended the prohibition to include funds belonging to trade unions, professional associations, civic, fraternal and religious groups. When the very
unique character of initiatives, referenda and other ballot
issues is considered, the constitutionality of such prohibition
must be seriously questioned. Recent judicial decisions have
limited the power of the state to regulate the use of corporate
funds in those types of elections such as initiatives, referenda and other ballot issues.7 The present Wyoming statute
regulating corporate expression, as well as the expression of
trade unions and similar organizations, would not meet the
constitutional test which has been developed in recent
judicial decisions, particularly that of the United States
Supreme Court in FirstNational Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
et al.' The Wyoming Legislature, if it desires regulations of
corporate expression in that arena, should legislate regulatory provisions which are constitutionally permissible under
the principles of the First National Bank of Boston case.
2.
3.

4.
5.

6.
7.

8.

U.S. News and World Report, October 9, 1978, at 30.
Cf Sterling, Control of Campaign Spending: The Reformers' Paradox, 59 A.B.A.J.
1148, 1152-53 (1973); King, CorporatePoliticalSpending and the FirstAmendment,
23 U.P.H.L. REV. 847 (1962); Haley, Limitations on PoliticalActivities of Corporations, 9 VILL. L. REV. 593, 611-14 (1964); EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 635-40 (1970).
Ervin, Campaign Practices and the Law: Watergate and Beyond, 23 EMORY L.J. 1
(1974); INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, Newsletter 4-5 (1975).
WYo. STAT. § 22-25-102 (1977).
WvO. STAT. § 22-25-102(a) (1977).
First National Bank of Boston, et. al. v. Bellotti, et. al., - U.S. __, 98 S.Ct. 1407
(1978); C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 420 F. Supp. 1254 (1976); Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz, 63 IIl. 2d 499, 349 N.E.2d 61 (1976); Pacific Gas and Electric
Co. v. Berkeley, 6 Cal. App. 3d 123, 131 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1976); 79 A.L.R. 3d 491
(1977).
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra note 7.
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Types of Referenda
The referendum, "a means by which a measure is submitted directly to the people for approval or disapproval," 9
takes a variety of forms." The compulsory referendum is
used if the state constitution stipulates that certain
measures must be referred to the electorate. The decision of
the electorate, then, is legally binding on the legislature.
Typically, this type of referendum is used for issuance of
state bonds, establishment of state banks, or extension of
the suffrage within a state." In every state, it is used for the
approval of a new constitution or constitutional amendment. 12 Wyoming statutes provide for the use of such a compulsory referendum in these and other circumstances, including use in political subdivisions of the state" for the isone persuance of bonds, for the acceptance of a county-wide
14
cent sales tax and the retention of judges.
The second type of referendum found in Wyoming is the
legislative referendum. In this case it is the prerogative of
the legislature to refer a statute to the electorate. If the
statute is popularly approved, then it becomes law. It should
be noted that the impetus for referring an issue to the electorate in this situation comes from the legislature and is not
constitutionally dictated."
The final type of referendum, the petition referendum or
initiative, originates directly from the electorate. Upon the
acquisition of a requisite number of signatures, the legislature is compelled to refer to the electorate the statute in
question. If the measure succeeds, the statute is given the
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.

Gazey, DirectDemocracy-A Study of the AmericanReferendum, 25 PARL. AFFAIRS
123, 123-139 (1971).
Id at 124-27.
Id at 124.
WYo. CONST. art. 20, § 1. Gazey, supra note 9, at 124.
Included in the statutory definition of political subdivisions in the State of Wyoming are the following:
...any county, city, town, school district, community college district,
hospital district, water conservancy district, cemetery district, fire protection district, or any other volitical subdivision of the state constitutins a
body corporate, whether incorporated under general act, special charter,
or otherwise.
WYo. STAT. J 22-21-102(a)(i) (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 22-21-103 (1977) (bond issues); Wyo. STAT. § 39-6-412 (1977) (onepercent sales tax issue); WYo. CONST. art. 5, § 4(g) (retention of judges).
Wvo. CONST. art. 3, § 52. See also Gazey, supra note 9, at 123. Wyoming, like all
other states except Wisconsin, does not allow use of the advisory referendum. This
type of referendum differs from the rompulsory referendum only in the formal
significance given the electoral decisioh. Gazey, supra note 9, at 125.
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force of law, while disapproval means its defeat.' 6 In the petition referendum or initiative process, the legislature is
generally restricted from amending any laws referred
through petition." Additionally, Wyoming, like most other
states which utilize this measure, does not allow initiatives
to deal with appropriation measures.' 8 Only in Nevada is the
electorate allowed the referral of all laws."9
HistoricalDevelopment of the Referendum
The referendum is characteristic of American democracy, affording greater opportunity for direct participation
and standing as an answer to the perplexing problem of controlling governmental abuses. 20 The referendum is a product
of the Progressive Era and was adopted by many states during that period. Wyoming, too, considered the introduction
of the referendum, along with the initiative and recall, early
in the twentieth century. Governor Joseph M. Carey first advanced the measures to the legislature in his 1911 message
to the Wyoming legislature, with such other participatory
measures as the Australian ballot,2 ' the direct primary
system 22 and a Corrupt-Practices Act.2 3 While the ballot,

primary and corrupt-practices measures were in some part
adopted in the 1911 legislative session, the initiative and
referendum proposal, after winning the support of the
legislature, failed to win the necessary majority of votes
among the electorate. 4 The initiative, referendum and recall
were again discussed by Carey in his 1913 message to the
legislature and he again strongly urged their adoption." The
legislature took no action on those measures during that
legislative session, however. 6
16.
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Gazey, supra note 9, at 127.
Id
WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 52(g). "The Wyoming Fair Coal Tax Committee ...has filed an
initiative application to impose an additional five percent severance tax on the value
of coal produced." Letter from Wyoming Secretary of State Thyra Thomson to
Margaret Maier Murdock (February 28, 1979). Subsection (g) of art. 3, § 52 does not
permit initiatives or referenda for the purpose of dedicating revenues. It is arguable
that the initiative proposed by the Wyoming Fair Coal Tax Committee is not a
dedication of revenues, but rather is the creation of revenues that can thereafter be
dedicated by the Legislature.
Gazey, supra note 9, at 127.
Id. at 123.
LARSON, HISTORY OF WYOMING 321-323 (1965).
Id.
Id
Id
Id. at 330.
Id.
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The move toward adoption of the referendum and other
participatory measures during the Progressive Era was initially an attempt to control abuses by the state
legislatures.17 Ironically, however, because many thought
that legislative abuse was a product of increased suffrage,25
the referendum was not immediately accepted as an instrument of control. 29 The increased participation which is the

essence of the referendum was identified with the dangers inherent in increased suffrage. Thus, for those fearful of increased democratization, the alternative lay in a greater centralization of control through a strengthened executive. 0
The Progressives, however, maintained their position that
only an increase in participation through the use of the
referendum and related measures" would alleviate abuses by
the legislature. In this regard, the Progressive Era made its
mark, as noted by historians:
the progressive movement was directed towards
a broader democracy and a greater efficiency in administration. It is clear that the reformers, however
acute in their disappointment in the actual function
of political and economic institutions, were not inclined to despair of democracy. There was none of
that tendency, so marked in European nations, to
achieve order at the cost of liberty, to substitute efficient dictatorship for inefficient popular government. On the contrary, most of the progressives had
a boundless faith in the efficacy of democracy, and
for all the ailments that assailed American institutions their panacea was more democracy. 2
...

Despite the initial acceptance given the referendum and
related measures, however, the procedures were not frequently used after their adoption. There was a marked
decline in the incidence of referenda use until following the
Second World War,33 when a new concern with government
stimulated a renewed interest in the referendum. This re27.

BEARD AND SHULTZ, DOCUMENTS ON THE STATE-WIDE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND
RECALL 4 (1912).

28.
29.
30.
31.

1d at
Id at
Id at
Other
recall,

32.
33.

11-12.
4-12.
6-7.
Progressive Era instruments of direct democracy included the direct primary,
initiative and the petition. Gazey, supra note 9, at 124. MORISON AND COMMAGER, 2 TIlE GROWTH OF TE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 467-70 (1962).
MORISON AND COMMAGER, supra note 31, at 465.
Gazey, supra note 9, at 123.
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newed interest was a response to the growth of government:
both the federal government and the state governments had
gradually extended their powers, perhaps as a result of the
increased demands placed upon them. 1 The outcome of this
growth in governmental tasks and taxation was a seeming
usurpation of popular power by the government. 5 Thus, the
renewed use of the referendum was a means by which some
measure of political power could be returned to the electhe direction and
torate, giving it a fuller role in determining
36
actions.
boundaries of governmental
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Wyoming did not adopt the use of the referendum and
initiative until the 1967 legislative session. The measures
were ratified by the electorate in the November, 1968 general
election and became effective in December, 1968.11 The
recall, a related participatory tool, has still not been adopted
in Wyoming. The measure again failed to gain the necessary
legislative support in the 1979 legislative session."
Since the adoption of the referendum and initiative in
1968, Wyoming has not yet utilized these measures on a
statewide basis. Since 1968 only seven applications for initiative petitions have been filed with the Secretary of
State. 9 While two of the petitions are currently being circulated in the state,"0 the first five initiative proposals failed
for lack of sufficient number of signatures on the initiative
petitions. 4' 1 No applications

have

been filed with

the

Secretary of State for referenda petitions since the adoption
of the referendum measure in 1968.2
Although use of the referendum has not yet been made
on a statewide basis in Wyoming as mentioned above, voter
approval of certain ballot issues is required for certain local
governmental decisions such as bond issues and the one percent sales tax proposals.43 In addition, on a statewide basis,
34.

Id.

35.

Id.

36.

Id.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Governor Hansen recommended the adoption of initiative and referendum measures
to the 1965 Legislature, but the measures were not adopted in that legislative session. LARSON, supra note 21, at 543. See WYo. CONST. art. 3, § 52.
Casper Star-Tribune, January 31, 1979, at 1, col. 5.
Letter from Wyoming Secretary of State, supra note 18.
I&
Id.
Id
WYo. STAT. § 22-21-103 (1977) (bond issues); Wyo. STAT. § 39-6-412 (1977) (onepercent sales tax issue); WYo. CONST. art. 5, § 4(g) (retention of judges).
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state constitutional amendments must be accepted by the
electorate in Wyoming, just as is the case in all other states,
before they become part of the state constitution. Thus,
though neither the initiative nor referendum have been
utilized by the citizens of Wyoming on a statewide basis,
through the use of a compulsory referendum the voters are
still called upon to participate on various ballot issues.
Perhaps the increased concern with governmental spending,
however, will promote the use of the referendum in the State
of Wyoming."
Contemporary Use of the Referendum
Although the frequency of referendum has increased
since the Second World War, among social scientists there is
little agreement as to its usefulness and appropriateness as a
contemporary instrument of political participation. While
contemporary usage of the referendum in Proposition 13-like
situations may increase social science investigation of
referenda, many appraisals of the modern use of the referendum are critical and disapproving."' Even among modern
supporters of the referendum 46 there is not found the
moralistic exurberance that marked the Progressive Era. 7
These modern referenda supporters have found their main
task to be answering arguments against continued use of the
referendum. 8
Those critical of referenda use have depended upon two
basic arguments. The first centers around the anachronistic
character of the referendum, while the second focuses on inherent flaws in the referendum which may lead to misuse.
44. - U.S. News and World Report, supra note 2. Certainly the adjustment of the mineral
severance tax is an issue that may well be ultimately submitted to the electorate.
Ironically, that initiative proposal seeks to raise taxes, in contrast to measures such
as California's Proposition 13.
45. Scott and Nathan, Public Referenda.-A Critical Reappraisal 5 URBAN AFF. Q. 313
(1970); Hamilton, Direct Legislation: Some Implications of Open Housing Referenda, 65 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 124 (1970); Horton and Thompson, Powerlessness and
PoliticalNegativism: A Study of Defeated Local Referendums, 67 AM. J. Soc. 485
(1962); McDill and Ridley, Status, Anomie, PoliticalAlienation and Political Participation,68 AM. J. Soc. 205 (1962); Wolfinger and Greenstein, The Repeal of Fair
Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting, 62 AM. POL. ScL. REV.

46.

767 (1968).
Gazey, supra note 9, at 123-39; Gwartney and Silberman, Distributionof Costs and
Benefits and the Significanceof Collective DecisionRules, 54 Soc. Sci. Q. 568(1973);

Bradshaw and Mercer, Vote for Your Future: The Anatomy of a Successful Capital
Improvements Bond Campaign, 10 NATION'S CiTiEs 27 (1972); Hamilton, supranote
47.
48.

45, at 137.
BEARD AND SHULTZ, supra note 27, at 1-70; THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC LEAGUE, THE
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 7-22 (1912).
Hamilton, supra note 45, at 125.
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With regard to its antiquated nature, critics have noted
that the referendum as an instrument of direct democracy is
functionally impossible on a large scale, especially in a complex, heterogeneous society."9 These critics question if "public indignation and deep suspicion of legislative behavior
(are) appropriate today," 0 and contend that the referendum
is not simply bothersome in its inefficiency and ineffectiveness. They feel that use of the referendum now may be a
serious impediment to an effective legislative process, 51 as
modern legislators can better formulate solutions to governmental problems because they can amass information more
efficiently and evaluate it better, and can thus come to more
"reasonable conclusions". 2 The success of California's Proposition 13 and the introduction of similar measures in more
than half of the United States,53 however, would lead one to
suspect that voters might not share in such an attitude.
With regard to the inherent faults in the referendum
system, commentators fear that the referendum "provides
an instrument for political manipulation and 'opinion-molding'

".1

Consequently, these critics claim that the way is

open for any well-finance interest group, with the aid of professional firms skilled in referenda campaigns to have an influence on referenda outcomes disproportionate with that interest group's representation in the general populace. Such
critics argue that public opinion would be molded in support
of the interest group's position through the use of emotional
appeals, scare tactics and the over-simplification of complicated problems through slogans.55 Even those most fervent in their support of the referendum as a means to control
government spending are as likely to express a fear of cor6
porate participation in referenda for just such a reason.
49.

Scott and Nathan, supra note 45, at 314. SYED, GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE: THE
POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 77, 81 (1966) notes (in Syed's

words) Woodrow Wilson's caution that "government by town meeting was a thing
of the past, feasible only in small, homogeneous communities. Americans ...were
resorting to direct legislation to force upon their representatives the consciousness
that their duty was to represent and serve the people and not the private interests."
50. Scott and Nathan, supra note 45, at 316.
51. Id at 326-27.
52.

Id at 317.

53.
54.
55.

U.S. News & World Report, supra note 2.
Scott and Nathan, supra note 45, at 317.
Id.; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

FACTORS

AFFECTING

POLLUTION

REFERENDA 61-62 (1971).

56.

Gazey, supra note 9, at 123-39; Gwartney and Silberman, supra note 46, at 568;
Bradshaw and Mercer, supra note 46, at 27; Hamilton, supra note 45, at 137.
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Such critiques of the use of the referendum are usually
empirically unsubstantiated. Others considering the validity
of the referendum have brought forward substantial statistical evidence to support its continued use, however.57
To the charge of antiquated impracticality, it has been
noted that regardless of its alleged inefficiency, the referendum is perhaps the only practical modern means to meet a
demand for direct political participation which has never
subsided entirely and may be again on the increase. Regarding the characterization of the referendum as a subversion of
the legislative process, it should be recognized that the
referendum is a complement of and not a substitute for
representative legislation."8 Examination of the use of the
referendum in the United States since the Second World
War substantiates such rationale.5" In short, the use of the
referendum, and in particular the legislative referendum,
does "....

not indicate legislative 'buck-passing,' "but rather

represents the satisfaction of a need for participation expressed by the electorate.6 0 The increased contemporary use
of the petition referendum may provide the legislatures not
only with legislation viewed as necessary by the public, but
also may provide the legislatures with parameters of public
concern on particular issues, including governmental spending and behavior of governmental officials.
Although any instrument of democratic government is
open to abuse, it is submitted that only when there is no
chance of effective use of such an instrument by the electorate should its use be abandoned. Especially with regard
to the use of referenda, it is questioned whether the campaigns surrounding referenda are any less rational than
those which elect representatives. 6 American voters react to
and seek certain things from a political campaign. A referendum is not different from an election of representatives in
57.

Gazey relied on an examination of the actual use of the referendum which had been
made by states between the years 1945-1968, and what decisions were reached in
each referendum. Gazey, supra note 9, at 123-39.
58. Id. at 131, 138, 139.
59. Gazey found that the petition referendum was used only 59 times in 10 states during
the 23-year period (1945-1968) of her study. The legislative referendum was used in
only 4 states for only 14 issues during that period. The advisory referendum was
also used by only 4 states during the period. The largest use of the referendum was
in the form of the compulsory referendum. The total number of uses reported in the
study was 336 for the 23-year period, for an average of 14.6 per year. Id. at 127-35.
60. Id. at 131.
61.
CAMPBELL. GURIN AND MILLER. THE VOTER DECIDES 144-164 (1954).
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this regard. In their interpretation of the electorate's reaction to political symbols as unthinking and accepting, it
must also be questioned whether analysts have not been
short-sighted in their judgments of the electorate's rationality, especially in view of the success of Proposition 13 and
like measures across the country.2
REGULATION OF CORPORATE EXPRESSION

No other facet of electoral regulation is so consumed
with suspicion and fear as that restricting corporate expression. Following the Watergate era, and, perhaps as a reaction to the disruptive effects of that period, many state
legislatures enacted stringent campaign laws designed to
limit the participation of corporations in electoral processes
and, in some cases, exclude corporations from the electoral
arena."3 In 1977, the Wyoming Legislature, reflecting a national trend, enacted legislation which would essentially prohibit the use of corporate funds in initiatives, referenda and
other ballot issues, both on the state and local level. 4
Chapter 25 of Title 22 of the Wyoming Statutes, 1977,
provides the framework by which Wyoming elections are
regulated. Specific sections of the chapter require that expenditures and contributions be fully disclosed. 6 1 However,
Section 22-25-102 contains the statutory provisions which
relate to corporations, labor unions, and practically any
other organization, other than political action groups and
political parties. 6 Sub-section (a) provides, in part, that:
no organization of any kind, including a corporation, partnership, trade union, professional association, or civic, fraternal or religious group.... directly or indirectly through any officer, member, director or employee, shall contribute funds, other items
U.S. News & World Report, supra note 2;

62.

KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY 127-28
(1971); DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260-76 (1957). Downs contended that rationality in voting was determined by the interest of the voter: when the
voter voted in his own self-interest, he was acting in a rational manner. Thus, while
it is perhaps true, as Campbell, et. al., contend, that voters do not always base their
vote on an informed and impartial analysis of the issues of a campaign, it is important to realize the rationality of their decisions (for thier own self-interest) in a
Downsian sense. Id.

63.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AND STATE CAMPAIGN
LAWS-SUMMARIES AND QUICK-REFERENCE CHARTS 287-303 (1977).

64.
65.
66.

WYO. STAT. § 22-25-102 (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 22-25-106 (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 22-25-102 (1977).
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of value or election assistance.., in order to aid or
romote the interests, success or defeat of any...
allot proposition. No persons shall solicit or
receive a payment or contribution from an organization prohibited from making contributions under
this sub-section. 7
The statutory provision does make some exception by allowing any organization to communicate directly with its
members regarding ballot issues.6 8 Presumably sub-section
(a) of the statute would include in its prohibition any increases in pay to employees or officers of a corporation or
labor union which would be made for the express or implied
purpose of using such increases as salary for communicating
the corporation or labor union's position with regard to any
initiative, referendum or other ballot issue. 9
As explained previously, the initiative and referendum
have not been used statewide in Wyoming. However, other
ballot measures, such as constitutional amendments, bond
issues, retention of district judges, and adoption of the 1%
sales tax option, are widely used. Presumably, the prohibition against corporate and labor union expression in ballot
measures would include these types of ballot measures. It
should also be noted that the Wyoming statute does not provide an exception to its prohibition when the interests of the
corporation or labor union are materially affected, as the
statutes of some other states do.7" In this respect, the
Wyoming statute represents a broader and more inclusive
prohibition.
Statutorily, the corporation or labor union in Wyoming
is precluded from participating with corporate or union
funds in any ballot measure or issue, even if that measure
materially affects the interests of the corporation or labor
union. Ostensibly, under Wyoming statute, a "political action committee" may be formed, by which individual officers, employees or members of a corporation or labor union
may express their views. However, the funding of the
political action group must be from individual donations. As
67.
68.

WYo. STAT. § 22-25-102(a) (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 22-25-102(d) (1977).

69.

The prohibition against direct and indirect contributions in this section would seem

70.

to imply such a restriction. WYo. STAT. § 22-25-102(a) (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 22-25-102 (1977).
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noted above, increases in salaries of officers and employees,
which are directly or impliedly made for the purpose of expressing the corporation's position on a ballot measure,
would be impermissible. Designation of union dues for a
similar purpose would be statutorily impermissible, unless
such designation is done on an individual and voluntary
basis. Accordingly, absent actual circumvention of the
statute, which is beyond the scope of this analysis,71 the corporation and trade union are effectively denied participation
in ballot issues.
The constitutionality of the statutory prohibition of corporate or labor union expression in Wyoming ballot issues
has apparently not been seriously challenged in the Wyoming state courts." However, it is submitted that the
Wyoming prohibition against corporate and labor union expression in ballot measures, as presently written, is constitutionally deficient as the statute fails to make adequate provision for guaranteeing first amendment freedom of expression made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution."
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE EXPRESSION

Traditionally, judicial decisions regarding corporate expression in referenda, as well as in other types of elections,
have supported legislative restrictions or prohibitions on
corporate expression." '
71.

72.
73.
74.

It is possible that corations, labor unions, or other organizations prohibited participation in both ba lot issues and candidate elections do in fact circumvent the
restrictions and contribute money or services or other goods in such campaigns.
That type of transgression, however, is not only outside the focus of this discussion,
but is also very difficult to document. Generally, see Ferman, Congressional Con.
trols on Campaign Financing: An Expansion or Contraction of the First Amendment? 22 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 21 (1972); Gallagher, New Jersey Election Reform, A New
Law For Old Campaigners,27 RUTGERS L. REV. 836, 842-3 (19741; Roady, Ten Years
of Florida's "Who Gave It-Who Got It" Law, 27 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 434
(1962).
Wvo. Op. Arr'y GEN. __
(1978).
Cf. __
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra note 7.
While not reaching the constitutional issue, the Court's opinion in United States v.
International Union United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, 352 U.S. 567, 568-84 (1956) far from dispelled the notion that
corporate wealth was in fact a danger to the electoral process. See also United
States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U.S. 106 (1947). In the federal
cases prior to the First National Bank of Boston case, the constitutionality of the
Federal Campaign Act was addressed in a piecemeal fashion. United States v.
Boyle, 482 F.2d 755 (D.C. cir. 1973) (held valid); United States v. First National
Bank, 329 F. Supp. 1251 (D.C. Ohio 1971) (held invalid as it applied to secured loan
given to candidates in the course of business at normal rates); United States v.
Pipefitters Local Union, 434 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir. 1970) (held valid).
On the state level, the results prior to the First National Bank of Boston case
were mixed, with courts generallv not reaching the constitutional issues by limiting
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The constitutionality of state restrictions or prohibitions upon corporate expression in elections was seldom
denied until recently." Although the United States Supreme
Court's decision in the FirstNational Bank of Boston 6 case
represents a radical departure from the previous judicial
tendency, it is nonetheless important to examine the constitutional rationale which accompanied judicial decisions
restricting corporate expression in order to understand the
basis of the Court's decision in the FirstNational Bank of
Boston case. Hopefully, such an examination will also aid in
finding a guide to the permissible bounds of restrictions on
corporate expression after that case.
The permissible constitutional bounds of state restrictions upon corporate expression should be analyzed within
the context of traditional first amendment tests" through
application of the fourteenth amendment. 8 Although the
clear and present danger test first announced in Schenk v.
United States" could possibly serve as an appropriate test,8 0
it is more likely, particularly after the Court's decision in the
First National Bank of Boston case, that a balancing test
less restricted by the constraining qualification of a showing
of "imminency" 81 would be used. As a general rule, courts
should be expected to utilize the general approach suggested
by Fleishman:
First, it classifies the individual right being asserted into one of three classes: (1) absolutely unprotected speech, such as non-public affairs libel
and whatever the court chooses to call "obscenity;"
(2) absolutely protected speech, such as that pure

75.
76.
77.

78.
79.
80.
81.

the statutes' application. Pecorav. Queens County Bar Ass'n., 46 Misc. 2d 530, 260
N.Y.S. 2d 116 (1965) (limited construction of campaign act precluded it from
reaching Bar activity in judge selection); Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 48
A.2d 754 (1946) (limited construction of state Corrupt-Practices Act did not bring incorporated bar association activity within contemplation of the statute); cf Bare v.
Gorton, 84 Wn. 2d 380, 526 P.2d 379 (Wash. 1974) (held state law, regulating
referenda as well as candidate selection elections, unconstitutional) noted in Election Law-Initiative 276-The Constitutionality and Feasibilityof Political Campaign Expenditure Limitations in Washington, 50 WASH. L. REV. 794 (1975).
Id.
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra note 7.
Free Speech Implications of Campaign Expenditure Ceilings, 7 HARV. CiV.
RIGHTs-Ci. Lia. L. REV. 215, 220-21 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Implications];
Constitutional Law-State Campaign Spending Restriction Violates the First
Amendment, 49 TUL. L. REV. 1146, 1149 (1975).
See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Ferman, supra note 71, at 17-20; Implications,supra note 77. at 221-22.
Ferman, supra note 71, at 20.
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and simple speech directly banned by sedition laws;
and (3) presumptively protected speech, such as all
other kinds of speech, association, petition and
assembly. Secondly, with respect to presumptively
protected speech, it evaluates and weights the particular freedom for which protection is sought.
Thirdly, it evaluates and weights the governmental
interest being asserted against it. Finally, it attempts to measure the means chosen in two ways:
by evaluating the extent of their negative impact on
the rights claimed by assessing their reasonable
relationship to, and comparative efficiency2 in serving, the legitimate governmental interest.
Initially, it should be noted that the use of corporate
funds for the purposes of influencing a referendum, initiative
or other ballot issue is not easily categorized as suggested
above. Although a contribution or expenditure contemplates
a conveyance of funds, it is also true that pure speech may
also result from the use of those funds in advertising and
personal solicitation., Given the difficulty in ascertaining
what component of the corporate expression might be
characterized as pure speech and what should be characterized as presumptively protected speech, it should be anticipated that courts will continue to merely categorize the
conveyance of corporate funds for purposes of political advocacy as expression, rather than trying to accomplish the
task of bifurcating corporate expression into its respective
components of pure and other types of speech. However, in
the past, courts and other commentators have attempted to
relegate the expression of corporations to the area of unprotected speech. Essentially, this was done by asking two
threshold questions: Is the corporation equivalent to a
natural individual? And, is the expression of the corporation
commercial or non-commercial? Accordingly, as courts have
done in the past, this analysis will assume that corporate expenditures or contributions have components of both pure
and other types of speech and, accordingly, are to be treated
as expression. 4
Fleishman, Freedomof Speech and Equality of PoliticalOpportunity: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 51 No. CAR. L. REV. 389,
408-410 (1973); See also Comment-The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971:
Reform of the PoliticalProcess?, 60 GA. L. REv. 1309 (1972).
83. Buckley, et. al. v. Valeo, et. al., 424 U.S. 1, 15-23 1976).
84. Id
82.
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TraditionalAnalysis: Threshold Questions-Status of the
Speaker and Characterof the Speech
As the restriction imposed upon corporate expression in
referenda, initiatives and other ballot issues emanate from
the state rather than from the federal government, 5 a constitutional challenge to the validity of such restrictions is
first met with the question of whether the expression has
constitutional protection under the first amendment as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. As
will be discussed, traditional analysis of this question has
turned, to a large extent, upon the status of the speaker and
the characterization of the speech involved. Courts and commentators have advocated the denial of constitutional protection if the corporate expression fails to meet the threshold
questions posed. Although, there has been a dramatic departure from examining the constitutionality of the restrictions
from the perspective of the status of the speaker and
characterization of the speech, it is still important to understand the basis of that analysis. While the two traditional
modes of analysis are similar, they represent distinct judicial
efforts to balance the very real societal fear of corporate
monopolization of opinion with the danger of prohibiting expression which might ultimately aid the electorate in making
a rational choice.
Status of the Speaker: The Right of the
Corporation to PoliticalExpression
Although it has long been recognized that expression
serves a societal function apart from the needs of the
speaker, 6 it is not surprising, given the American legal
system's emphatic attention to individual rights and freedoms, 87 that traditional analysis has proceeded from the proposition that the protection to be accorded expression is in
large part defined by the rights that would otherwise be
given to the speaker.
85.
86.
87.

WYO. STAT. § 22-25-102 (1977). See also LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 63, at
287-303, for a listing of the respective state restrictions on corporate expression.
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra note 7, at 1416, n. 12.
See in general the FEDERALIST PAPERS (Hacker, ed) (1964).
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As the corporation has been entitled to many of the
rights belonging to real or natural individuals, 8 opponents
of laws prohibiting corporate expression have simply presumed the extension of first amendment rights to the corporation." Yet the presumption that first amendment rights
would be extended to the corporation in fact failed to appreciate the extent to which the law has distinguished the
corporation from the natural person. Although the corporation is entitled to the protections of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, the
corporation is not guaranteed the protections that would
otherwise be found in the privileges and immunities clause of
that amendment.9 Additionally, the corporation's rights
under the due process clause are further limited as the corporation is not entitled to the fifth amendment protection
against self-incrimination, 9 nor is it entitled to vote.92 Thus,
the simple equating of the corporation with a natural individual has proven insufficient as a conceptual tool, given
the very clear judicial distinguishing of corporate and
natural rights in other areas.
In a similar vein, by urging the constitutionality of prohibitions on corporation expression, the proponents of such
prohibitions on corporate expression have argued that the
corporation, as a creature of the state, is susceptible to state
restrictions or limitations through the incorporation laws of
the state. 3 The incorporation argument, however, is vulnerable to attack in at least two respects. First, only two states
have any express restriction on corporate expression in their
laws of incorporation which would limit expression as a condition precedent to incorporation.94 It is significant to note
that Wyoming is not one of those two states.95 Indeed, most
states impose restrictions upon corporate expression only
after the corporation is established. Consequently, if states
88.

See, e.g., King, CorporatePoliticalSpending and the FirstAmendment, supra note
3. at 854-64 (1962); Barrow, Regulation of Campaign Funding and Spending for
FederalOffice, 5 J. LAW REFORM 159 (1972).

89.

Haley, Limitations on Political Activities of Corporations, 9 VILL. L. REV. 593,

90.

611-13 (1964).
Rosenthal, Campaign Financingand the Constitution, 9 HARV. J. 359, 380 (1972).

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. People v. Gansley, 191 Mich. 357, 158 N.W. 195 (1916); United States v. United
States Brewers' Ass'n., 239 F. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916); see also CorporateContributions
to Ballot.Measure Campaigns, 6 J. LAW REF. 781, 791-3 (1973).
94.

95.

FLETCHER, 6A CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2939 (1968).

WYo. STAT. §§ 17-1-103 and 17-1-201 through 205 (1977).
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such as Wyoming are to maintain the validity of a prohibition or restriction on corporate expression because of the artificial nature of the corporation, such an argument must
proceed from a different basis than the restrictions which are
96
placed upon the organization in its pre-incorporated stage.
Most modern corporation acts, like that in Wyoming,
reflect a trend from a concession to an enabling philosophy.
The corporation is often given an implied grant of power to
accomplish all that is essential to its purpose. 97 Although at
least two commentators have registered their disagreement
with the premise that corporate contributions and expenditures may accomplish corporate purposes, 9 legislative
recognition of corporate donations for charitable purposes99
and the accepted use of corporate funds for lobbying efforts '00 would seem to reveal the antiquated notion of such
an argument. In addition, the incorporation argument would
not be applicable to attempted regulation by one state of a
corporation incorporated elsewhere.'01 Finally, like the argument of those would simply equate the first amendment
rights of the corporation to those which are granted to a
natural person, the incorporation argument fails to adequately account for the varied judicial recognition that had
been given corporate rights in other areas.
Perhaps in reaction to the limitations imposed by viewing the corporation as an individual for the purpose of assessing what rights or protections were to be accorded the
corporation under the first and fourteenth amendments, op96.
97.
98.

99.

100.
101.

The notable exception being the reservation in most acts of the right to amend the
Corporation Act. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 149 (1974); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 519 (1819).
WYo. STAT. § 17-1-104(a)(xviii) (1977); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 4(q)
(1974)
BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 85 (1946); FLETCHER, 6 CYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 2939 {1950). However, the more recent edition of Fletcher

seems to renounce this earlier position. FLETCHER, supra note 94. See also Corporate
Contributions to Ballot-Measure Campaigns, supr note 93, at 791-93.
WYo. STAT. § 17-1-104(a)(xiii) (1977); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 4(m)
(1974).
See Haley, supra note 89, at 609-11.
However, see the concept of quasi-foreign corporations in Western Airlines v.
Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961). For the corporation which
obtains a certificate of authority to transact business in Wyoming, the Wyoming
statutes dictate that such corporations, by making application for certificate, are
subject to "the same duties, restrictions, penalties and liabilities now or hereafter
imposed upon a domestic corporation of like character." Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-702
(1977). For those corporations that do not obtain a certificate of authority, but
might otherwise contribute to referenda within Wyoming, the incorporation argument is arguably inapplicable unless the quasi-foreign corporation concept is
employed.
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ponents of laws prohibiting corporation expression argued
that corporations were constitutionally protected due to the
essentially group basis of corporations" 2 and the substantive rights of the individuals in that corporation to associate
freely.103 This position was bolstered by the utilitarian tenet
that to some extent political articulation became more effective by association. Citing NAACP v. Alabama,"" commentators have noted the need to further political goals through
individuals combining for the articulation of their interests.
The coincidence of economic and political combinations
should be viewed no more suspiciously than any other combinations or associations.' 5 In addition, following the traditional lines of division in an industrial society, commentators who argued for the unconstitutionality of the prohibition on corporate expression maintained that articulation of
the corporate interest was necessary to counter-balance the
voice of labor,'0 6 often not reached by state restrictions' 7
and, arguably, not needing the protective care provided by
federal and state governments in labor's infancy during the
New Deal.'0 8
Although the aggregate or association arguments might
certainly be applicable to the small or closely-held corporation, it has been questioned whether the political expression
of large, publically-held corporations was truly reflective of
Commenthe political dispositions of its shareholders.'
tators have pointed out that large blocks of stock of
publically-held corporations are often held by other financial
institutions such as mutual investment groups. Thus, the expression supposedly made for the real individual might be
two or three times removed from its purported sources.110
Cf Corporate Contributions to Ballot-Measure Campaigns, supra note 83, at 786.
See, e.g., Mr. Justice Stewart's sentiment in his dissenting opinion in Lucas v.
Forty-fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 749 (1964):
Representative government is a process of accommodating groups' interests through democratic institutional arrangement. Its function is to
channel the numerous opinions, interests, and abilities of the people of a
State into the making of the State's public policy.
103. See the discussion by Ferman, supra note 71. at 13-15 with regard to disclosure of
contributions.
104. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
105. Cf CorporateContributionsto Ballot-MeasureCampaigns,supra note 93, at 786-91.
106. Wood, Corporationsand Politics, 22 Bus. LAW. 775, 778 (1967).
107.- LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 63, at 287-303. However, it should be noted that
the Wyoming statutory provision treats corporations and labor unions alike. See
text, infra, at note 6.
108. Cf. Wood, supra note 106, at 778.
109. Rosenthal, supra note 90, at 383; Implications, supra note 77, at 252.
110. Rosenthal, supra note 90, at 383.
102.
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Consequently, the content of the expression was suspect. In
fact the findings of numerous studies have revealed that the
policy of the corporation was often controlled by self-perpetuating management rather than the stockholders."' Even if
management was responsive to stockholders, some commentators have argued that the disproportionate influence which
a majority stockholder or a group of stockholders having a
majority of the shares possessed, prevented the application
of the one man, one vote principle" 2 which should serve as
the basis for protected association." 3 If corporate expression
was to be protected as a result of the association of individual stockholders, employees and clients, it was in turn
argued that each element should have equal representation
to insure that the corporate expression was truly reflective
of the interests within and without the corporation. In view
of the disparate influence which could be exercised by majority shareholders or management, it was maintained that
an equal protection question with regard to equal represen-4
tations truly existed with regard to corporate expression."
If the corporation did not in fact conform to the image of
a reflective conveyor of political information for shareholders, employees and clients that might be desired theoretically," 5 it should also be noted that the substantive content of
the corporation's message was never analyzed. Rather, in examining the rights of the corporate speaker as an aggregate,
the kernel of the analysis became the impeding effect which
the restriction or prohibition expression had upon the process of association for the articulation of interests. It was
111.
112.
113.
114.

BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 69 (1932);
contra Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427
(1964).
Rosenthal, supra note 90,at 383.
L.
See Fleishman, Public Financingof Election Campaigns:ConstitutionalConstraints
on Steps Toward Equalityof PoliticalInfluence of Citizens, 52 No. CAR. L. REV. 349,
352-69 (1973); Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 815, 819-21 (1974).
It suffices to note that the First National Bank of Boston Court held that inequalities in persuasion cannot serve as a basis for prohibiting expression without
destroying the basis of democratic society itself-the ability of each voter to make
that electoral choice which best serves his interest, however perceived. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra note 7, at 1423. See also generally, Wilkinson, The Supreme Cour_, The EqualProtection Clause,
and the analysis
Three Faces
of tend
ConstitutionalEquality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975). Also, Manna's
would

to suggest
greater
economic
rationality
in the corporate
decision, though
notacquire
based
on
the one-man,
one-vote
principle,
as shareholders
may purchase
shares to
115.

a greater Voice in those issues which more crucially affect them. Manna, supra note
111, at 1427-430.
Rosenthal, supra note 90, at 383.
'
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perhaps the remote relationship of many shareholders to the
control of the corporation that caused many to believe that
the freedom of association argument was little more than a
subterfuge for the corporation's right to substitute its expression for that of its shareholders, employees and
clients."86
In retrospect, the attempts to equate the corporation
with an individual or utilize the organization of the corporation as a basis for claiming freedom of association were legally inadequate because they were simply too limited. In examining only one aspect of the communicative process
-namely, the speaker-those making such arguments failed
to appreciate the societal function which corporate expression might serve apart from the status of the speaker.
Although some attempt was made to examine the content of
the corporate expression, the analysis utilized before the
FirstNationalBank of Boston case was overly simplistic in
its attempt to characterize the expression as either commercial or presumptively protected speech.
Characterof the Speech: Restrictions on
CorporateExpression
In answer to the contentions of opponents to statutes
prohibiting or restricting corporate expression-that the
speech or expression of the corporation is not capable of
regulation unless the state shows a compelling need to do so,
courts have attempted to categorize the speech, excluding
from any protection that corporate speech or expression
which is purely commercial in nature.11 7 The classic formulation of the commercial speech exception was found in Valentine v. Christensen.""On its face, the Valentine decision simply required that a determination be made as to the
character of the corporate expression or speech. Once such a
determination was made, the protections which accompanied such expression or speech then flowed from the requisite category to which the speech or expression was
assigned. That speech which was characterized as commer116.
117.
118.

In fact. King advocates this position and sees it as an adjunct to the proposition
that one should express himself as effectively as possible. King, supra note 3, at 863.
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 J1942.
Id.
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cial was not entitled to the protection, while that characterized as non-commercial was entitled to such protection.
Initially, commentators strenuously argued that even a
Valentine exception was an abridgement of first amendment
rights.119 However, even putting aside the wisdom of the
Valentine exception, it was submitted that corporate expression could never be completely free of commercial utility.
Thus, even those political expressions which would otherwise be entitled to the protections of the first amendment
were, under a Valentine exception, unprotected as the corporation may have some commercial goal which was satisfied by the advocacy of the essentially political position.
Additionally, it was questioned whether a test which incorporated the Valentine exception could ever be constructed. Although a profit-informational dichotomy had
been suggested as a standard to differentiate commercial
speech from that which was not commercial,' the expanded
definitions of business purposes in the lobby context would
have dictated a different standard. Perhaps a standard could
have been constructed which would have distinguished expression aimed at consumer consumption of an immediate
product from that which, while ultimately affecting continued profitable commercial activity of the corporation, had
as its focus persuasion of the electorate with regard to a
political choice. For example, corporate expression in support of a school bond issue would hardly be commercial
speech, though success of such an issue might result in better working conditions for employees, a more stable economic base and perhaps a more profitable market.
Any standard which attempted to accomplish the exception set forth in the Valentine case had to categorize speech
which admittedly had both components of commercial and
non-commercial information. While the standard suggested
above, as well as that discussed by other commentators, was
theoretically feasible, it failed to give any substantive definition to commercial speech or differentiate it from that corporate expression which had very definite political connota119. Cf Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context 78 HARV. L. RFV. 1191 (1965).
120. Implications, supra note 77, at 219.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1979

21

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 14 [1979], Iss. 2, Art. 4

470
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEV
Vol. XIV
tions. Thus, the theoretical approach suggested by Valentine
had largely been abandoned in judicial decisions,'2 1 even
before the First National Bank of Boston case.
Until the First National Bank of Boston case, both the
courts and commentators attempted to analyze the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting corporate expression in
referenda by either examining the status of the speaker or
characterizing the corporate expression as commercial versus non-commercial expression. Both analytic frameworks
have failed as both, having different foci, essentially attempted to bifurcate society into commercial or economic interests and political interests. In retrospect, given the admittedly substantial economic basis of politics,'22 it was
understandable why these analytic frameworks had to be
discarded. In large part, the United States Supreme Court in
the First National Bank of Boston case abandoned the
previous approaches. Instead, the Court has centered its examination upon the third aspect of the communicative process-namely, the listener and his need or right to receive
relevant information in making an informed choice.
The Hearer'sRight to Know: First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
The First National Bank of Boston, as well as other national banking associations and business corporations, challenged the constitutionality of a Massachusetts law which,
in pertinent part, specified that:
no business corporation incorporated under the
laws of or doing business in the Commonwealth and
no officer or agent acting in behalf of any corporation mentioned in this section, shall directly or indirectly give, pay, expend or contribute, or promise
to give, pay, expend or contribute, any money or
other valuable thing for the purpose of aiding, promoting or preventing the nomination or election of
any person to public office, or aiding, promoting or
antagonizing the interests of any political party, or
121.

122.

Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 764 (1976). The First National Bank of Boston Court discarded the Valentine
exception. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra note 7, at 1420, n. 20.
Almond and Powell, A Developmental Approach to PoliticalSystems: An Overview
in FINELE AND GABLE, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE 54 (1971).
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influencing or affecting the vote on any question
submitted to the voters, other than one materially
affecting any of the property, business or assets of
the corporation. No question submitted to the
voters solely concerning the taxation of the income,
property or transactions of individuals shall be
deemed materially to affect the property, business
or assets of the corporation. ' "
A constitutional amendment that would have permitted
the Massachusetts Legislature to create a graduated personal income tax was to be submitted to the electorate at a
general election. The First National Bank of Boston, as well
as the other appellants, brought an action to have the
statute declared unconstitutional.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused to
set aside the legislative finding embodied in the Massachusetts law regarding the materiality of the ballot issue in
question. The Massachusetts court then determined the constitutional issue to be one of whether the corporations involved were entitled to the same rights as an individual
under the fourteenth amendment if the political issue in
question did not materially affect the corporation's interests. In upholding the constitutionality of the prohibition,
the Massachusetts court adopted a novel variation of the
traditional approaches discussed previously.
The Massachusetts court held that the corporations
were entitled to the same protection under the fourteenth
amendment as an individual would be, but restricted the protection to only those business or property interests of the
corporation which would be affected by the electorate's approval of the referendum if later adopted by the legislature.
As there existed a legislative finding, upheld by the Massachusetts court, that the ballot issue in question would not
materially affect the "property, business or assets of the corporation," the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held
that the proposed expression of the appellant corporations
was not entitled to the protection of the fourteenth amend1

ment.
123.
124.

24

ch. 55. § 8 (Supp. 1975).
First National Bank of Boston, et. al. v. Attorney General 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1270
(1977).
MASS. GEN. LAWS,
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Upon appeal, the appellant corporations initially asked
the Court to decide the constitutional question on the narrower issue of the validity of the legislative finding regarding materiality.2 5 A five to four majority of the Court refused to take such a limited view of the case, but instead considered the larger issue of the constitutionality of the prohibition.' 26 Mr. Justice Powell, speaking for the majority of
the Court, rejected the view that the case could be decided
simply upon the status of the speaker or the character of the
speech, stating that:
We thus find no support in the First or Fourteenth
Amendments, or in the decisions of this Court, for
the proposition that speech that otherwise would be
within the protection of the First Amendment loses
that protection simply because its source is a corporation that cannot prove, to the satisfaction of a
court,2 7 a material affect on its business or property.1
The majority opinion did not go as far as the position
taken by Mr. Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion,
in which the Chief Justice suggested that corporate expression is to be protected absolutely under the freedom of
press.' 8 However, the majority opinion did find in the
freedom of the press cases the germ of the proposition that
the Court would bring to fruition in the FirstNationalBank
of Boston case. The majority noted that those cases were
"based not only on the role of the First Amendment in
fostering individual self-expression but also on its role in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the
29
dissemination of information and ideas.'1
The majority opinion, over a strenuous dissent, eliminated as a practical consideration the threshold questions
which had previously been interposed before corporate expression could be viewed as presumptively protected expression or speech. In large part, the First National Bank of
Boston case effectively relegated the constitutional question
to one of weighing the hearer's right to know against the
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra note 7, at 1414-15.
Id at 1415-20.
Id. at 1420.
Id. at 1427-29.
Id at 1419.
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state's interest in the regulation. While the Court did not go
as far as equating the expression of any corporation to that
of the press, the majority opinion did clear the conceptual
and theoretical underbrush which had surrounded the initial
threshold questions of the corporation's right to expression.
While the state was given significant latitude in the regulation of corporate expression, it is submitted that such
regulation can only be accomplished upon the showing of a
compelling state interest. The Court's formulation of the
standard to be applied in determining whether the state's interest was to be characterized as compelling took on dimensions that were not previously revealed.
The Balance of the State's Interest Against the
Hearer'sRight to Information
The "constitutionality of... (the) prohibition of the 'exposition of ideas' by corporations turns on whether it can
survive the exacting scrutiny necessitated by a stateimposed restriction of freedom of speech."130 As the prohibition was aimed at political expression, the Court further required that the balance would be struck in favor of the expression unless the state could show a "subordinating interest which is compelling'' 131 by means that are "closely
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement.' 13 While the
Court's formulation of the test is not dissimilar to that used
on other occasions, the test is significant in that the nature
and character of the election are interjected into the balancing process.
The interests of the state presented in this context of
the restriction of corporate expression were essentially twofold: the protection of the integrity of the electoral process
and the protection and the safeguarding of minority stockholders who might well disapprove of the corporate expression. 3"' 3 As the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White
demonstrated, the majority of the Court was unwilling to examine the state's purported need to protect the electoral process in the abstract. 134 Recognizing that "preserving the in130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id at 1421.
Id., citing Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960.
Id, citing Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 83, at 25.
Id at 1422, 1424.
Id at 1432-34.
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tegrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, and
'sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of the individual
citizen in a democracy for wise conduct of government' are
interests of the highest importance," '3 5 the Court gave
predominant importance to the character and nature of the
referendum in noting that "the people in our democracy are
entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating
the relative merits of conflicting arguments."1 3 6 To argue, as
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts did, that corporate expression in a referendum may persuade the electorate to take
a position contrary to the electorate's own interests is certainly to question the very rationality of the electorate. In
doing so, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts adopted a
"highly paternalistic"1 3' 7 attitude that, though laudable in its
intentions, was essentially undemocratic.'3 8
As the referendum results in an immediate electoral
decision, leaving no decisions to an intermediate elected official who might possibly be beholden to special interests,
the state's primary interest in restricting corporate expression must be the fear of a corporate monopoly of political expression in referenda. Such a fear, in large part, is based
upon a perception of the corporation as having the resources
and ability to mold opinion grossly out of proportion to its
representation within the society. Such a view is not supported by the literature which has been amassed investigating the influence of interests within a referendum, 3 9
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id- at 1422, citing United States v. International Union United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, supra note 74, at 575.
Id at 1424.
Id., n. 31.
Id at 1423.
Some studies critical of corporate participation in referenda have characterized corporate expression in terms of a veto effect. One study that investigated the success
and failure of pollution referenda cited a variety of variables as influencing the outcome of referenda. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, FACTORS AFFECTING
POLLUTION REFERENDA 4 (1971). One set of characteristics fell under the population
category. Population characteristics referred to the proportion of the population
with a family income less than $3,000 and also to the median income in the community. It was especially noted that "bond elections for pollution control projects are
more likely to pass in communities with a high percentage of low-income families."
Id. Another group of variables dealt with the community, while the third set of
characteristics dealt with the type of issue involved in the referendum.
Community characteristics were those indicating (1) the existence of a pollution problem, (2) population growth and 13) tax rate. The existence of a problem was
found to be positively associated with approval of pollution control referenda;
population growth was "associated with the failure of pollution control bonds" and
the tax rate was negatively correlated with pollution control referenda success. Id.
Issue characteristics referred to the amount of the issue proposed and also to
the method of repayment. The study found that "the amount of the issue is
negatively correlated with passage of the bonds." Id. at 5.
The final set of variables dealt with the influence of campaign factors, and
were considered the most influential. These variables included the existence of op-
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nor does it comport with the experience in California referenda in which corporate expression proved to be counterposition groups, partisanship of groups in the campaign and the number of criticisms raised. Among these variables, the most important, accounting "for 41% of
the variance in election outcome," was the existence of opposition groups in the
campaign:
The power of opposition groups lies in their ability to create doubt in the
minds of the undecided voters. When there is organized opposition, there
is little that proponents can do to make an issue pass. Id
The study noted that effectiveness of the opposition to an issue seemed to come
from "the ease with which one can create doubt in the minds of the voters." Id. at
62. Most voters, it was argued, "are simply trying to make a difficult decision on the
Rather than vote to spend
basis of inadequate and conflicting information ....
money for aproject for which the benefits are perceived to be uncertain, the doubtful voter will vote against the bond issue." Id. at 65. The inference, of course, could
well be that corporate involvement provides the means for such manipulative opposition. Scott and Nathan, supra note 45, at 317.
Other studies have dissected this phenomenon further, however, and have
found that a multiplicity of subfactors influenced the electorate's reception of a
referendum issue. The effect of elite involvement, corporate and otherwise, was
found to be a major contributing factor in the success of measures aimed at consolidating local governments. Henderson and Rosenbaum, Prospects for ConsolidatingLocal Government: The Role of Elites in ElectoralOutcomes, 17 AM. J. OF
POL. Sci. 695 (1973). That study found that "success (of a referendum) will be
associated with high levels of elite support and involvement in the campaign ... ; a
campaign'a failure will be associated with active elite opposition to the plan or low
levels of elite participation on behalf of it." Thus, elite ambivalence was as detrimental to the success of a referendum as actual opposition. Id. at 704-705.
Nor is the elite structure as unitary in interests as might be thought. Zeigler,
The Group, Its Membership, and the Public in SEASHOLES, VOTING, INTEREST
GROUPS, AND PARTIES 53, 56 (1966); STOKES, VOTING RESEARCH AND THE
BUSINESSMAN IN POLITICS 23 (1960); TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951)
(classic discussion of the role of interest groups within a group theory of politics).
As has been noted, "success is dependent upon (1) getting major interest
groups to take an active part in promoting the consolidation plan, and (2) attracting
a broad spectrum of organizations and their leaders to endorse the proposal.'
must
variety
a widebeing
single group
sup-process,
at 699.
thatofnogroups
and Rosenbaum,
implication
Henderson
theThus,
in the referenda
involved
become
wields sufficient influence to affect the outcome of the process single-handedly.
Although broad elite support of a referendum issue was found to be
necessary, it should also be noted that broad support is not alone a sufficient condition for success. Success was also found to be dependent upon the distribution of
political influence, both actual and potential, among a community's members. The
extent to which an elite of any variety influenced a referendum issue was correlated
with the degree to which resources available to it were uncommitted. While the findings on this point were not conclusive, there was substantial evidence to support the
proposition that success was more likely in "communities with (1)a slack elite structure, and (2) a high level of involvement in the campaign for consolidation by
previously unmobilized political influentials." Id at 701. Thus, the degree to which
any interest was efficacious in its referenda expression was determined at least in
part by the general political system and not solely by the financial resources the interest could bring to bear on a referendum question.
Finally, success will depend spmewhat on the elite's perception of civic involvement and, in particular, the role of civic dissatisfaction, Id. at 701-702. This is
so, as there is some tendency for success to be "associated with a significant intensity and diffusion of civic dissatisfaction among community influentials; failure will
follow when civic dissatisfaction among influentials is not widespread and intense."
Id. at 702.
The net effect of the multiplicity of subfactors evaluation of the referendum is
the rejection of the simplistic notion that the corporation. act-*ng by itself, can exercise an effective veto over a referendum issue. The validity and the utility of the
group theory of democracy, coupled with a search for the numerous subtleties which
affect a referendum outcome leads to the conclusion that "[a] more plausible assessment of the role of pressure groups in the electoral process can be made if we consider them as allies of the regular political organizations." Ziegler, supra, at 702. The
considerable skepticism of the First National Bank of Boston Court prevented it
from accepting the contention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that corporations wielded excessive influence in referenda. First National Bank of Boston v.
ellotti. supra note 7, at 1423.
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productive.'40 On a more theoretical basis, however, the First
National Bank of Boston Court, while leaving open the
possibility of a future case in which the state interest in prohibition could be proven to be compelling, found that the rationality of the electorate must be presumed until substantial evidence indicates otherwise.' 4 ' Thus, though the Court
noted that "the risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections" did exist, the Court held that such a
risk "simply is not present in a popular vote on a public
issue."'"
Addressing the second interest of the state in prohibiting corporate expression in referenda, the majority of
the Court found that the protection of minority shareholders
or shareholders who did not approve of the corporate expression was "belied, however, by the provisions of the statute"
that were both "under and over inclusive."' 4 It should be
noted that the Court did not examine the appropriateness of
the provisions after once having concluded that the need to
protect shareholders was a compelling one. Rather, the majority of the Court found that the inappropriateness of the
measures used to protect the shareholders indicated that the
needs in protecting shareholders was not a compelling one
for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.'4 4 This seeming
juxtaposition of tests demonstrates the scrutiny with which
the Court will examine the interests of the state in determining whether such interests are compelling.
Turning aside the purposes of regulation suggested by
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and taken up by Mr.
Justice White in his dissenting opinion, 45 the Court found
that the statutory prohibition was under-inclusive in that
the corporation could engage in lobbying and, in certain instances, could even express itself in ballot issues, if those
ballot issues materially affected the interests of the corporation. 146 On the other hand, a majority of the Court found that
the statutory provisions regarding prohibition of corporate
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See, generally, Corporate Contributions to Ballot-Measure Campaigns, supra note
93.
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra note 7, at 1423.
Id
Id at 1424.
Id at 1424-25.
Id. at 1434-38.
Id at 1424-25.
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expression were over-inclusive in that they precluded corporate expression even when such expression would be unan14
7
imously approved by shareholders of that corporation.
Making abbreviated reference to the rights of minority
shareholders which are enforced through derivative suits
and intra-corporate remedies,' 8 the Court found that the
protection of the shareholders, even if a compelling state interest, was not done through statutory provisions which
were reasonably correlated to the ends sought to be
achieved.'

49

The majority of the Court, by its decision in the First
National Bank of Boston case, removed the threshold questions which had generally been interposed before corporate
expression was characterized as presumptively protected by
discarding traditional approaches to examining the constitutionality of prohibitions on corporate expression. Instead,
the Court focused upon the hearer's right to information and
found that such a right could not be restricted without a
definite showing of a compelling state interest, particularly
when the election involved was one in which the electorate
made an immediate decision, such as in a referendum or
other ballot issue.
In considering the compelling nature of the state's interest, the Court perhaps also gave notice that it would no
longer ratify legislative findings when the effect of such findings was to preclude the electorate from receiving relevant
information that could be utilized in its electoral decisionmaking.
PERMISSIBLE REGULATION OF CORPORATE EXPRESSION
IN REFERENDA, INITIATIVES AND OTHER BALLOT ISSUES

After the decision in FirstNationalBank of Boston, it is
clear that the present Wyoming statutory provision prohibiting corporate expression in referenda, initiatives and
other ballot issues is unconstitutional. If the Wyoming State
Legislature is of the opinion that the expression of corporations should be regulated in such elections, it ought to revise
147. Id at 1425-26.
148. Id
149. Id. at 1426.
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the present Election Code in accordance with the dictates of
the FirstNationalBank of Boston case. Because of the First
National Bank of Boston case, it may also be prudent for the
Wyoming State Legislature to re-examine the Election Code
in its totality. Greater definitional specificity will only aid
the State in overcoming any challenges to the constitutionality of the Election Code. Consequently, complete revision of the Election Code is advisable. In part, the revision
should include a far more specific definition of the activities
which are to be reached by the statutory restrictions as well
as revision of the provisions respecting regulation of corporate expression.
Activities Reached by State Regulation
Of CorporateExpression
Before ascertaining the actual methods of regulation of
corporate expression in ballot issues, it is necessary to appreciate the reach which such regulations may have. In view
of the demanding scrutiny of the United States Supreme
Court in the First National Bank of Boston case, the
Legislature should thoroughly define that corporate conduct
activity which it seeks to regulate.' 0 Besides the expected
transfer of currency, either in the form of a contribution' or
an expenditure, 15 2 statutes restricting corporate expression

may also reach the following:
1. the furnishing of supplies or use of corporate
equipment; '
150.

151.

152.

153.

In many instances there will be no judicial interpretation of a state's statute and its
exact meaning with regard to corporate expression in referenda must await litigation. As this deters corporate expression, it must be anticipated that poorly-defined
statutes will come under greater judicial scrutiny.
The term may mean simply currency or can extend to "anything of value." Cf 24
A.L.R. Fed. 162, 167 (1976). Within the context of a referendum, the term, as contrasted with an expenditure, may have no real importance. See text, infra, footnote
178. After the Buckley v. Valeo case, the term contribution generally denoted giving
funds to a candidate, group or committee authorized to take donations for such a
candidate or group.
The term expenditure generally denotes spending funds to promote a candidate or
group, provided such funds are not under the control or supervision of either the
candidate, the group, or any representative of the candidate or group. Prior to the
Buckley v. Valeo case, much federal litigation had centered upon this term. See, e.g.,
United States v. Anchorage Central Labor Council. 193 F. Supp. 504 (D.C. Alaska
1961) Ithe cost of four television broadcasts lasting 15 minutes each was not an expenditure); United States v. Lewis Food Co., 366 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1966) (whether
the corporation's appraisal of the candidates' records placed in advertisement was
intended as "active electioneering" and, thus an expenditure, was a jury question).
See, e.g., KY, REv. STAT. § 121.015(6)(c) (1974).
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2. the allowing of corporate employees to work for
corporation; 114

an issue while being paid by the

3. the communicating with employees by the corporation 1 5 even if such communication is permitted only during certain periods;'- 6
clientele and customers
4. the communicating5 with
7
of the corporation;
5. the communicating with stockholders by the corporation;' 58 1

6. the soliciting of stockholder contributions by the
corporation 59 even when such contributions are
to e used in segregated accounts;' 60 and,
7. any activity of a majority shareholder, even

the
when such activities are financed through
16
personal funds of such shareholder.'

Although the reach of statutes may vary, it is incumbent upon the State to enact a regulatory system which

removes, to the extent possible, any ambiguities regarding
the reach of the regulations. In its present form, the Wyoming statutory provisions are ambiguous with regard to
most of the above activities.6

2

It is submitted that the cor-

poration's communications with employees, shareholders
and customers or clientele should not be within the reach of

any regulations. Additionally, Wyoming might do well to
adopt the thorough definitional provisions patterned after

the Federal Election Code which have been enacted by other
states. Such definitional provisions do much to remove the
ambiguity regarding the reach of the regulations and thus
provide the statutory scheme with greater legitimacy in the
face of constitutional challenge.
See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 121.015(6)(b) )1974).
Arguably, this practice is not permitted under present Wyoming law. WYo. STAT. §
22-25-102(d) (1977). This might be the conclusion drawn from such provisions as Ky.
REV. STAT. § 121.015(6)(c) (1974). See, e.g., ARaz. REV. STAT. § 16-304 (1975) as applied to communication through pay envelopes.
156. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 3-1-30-11 (1975) precluding display of handbills during a 90-day
period preceding election.
157. Arguably, this practice is not permitted under the present Wyoming law. Wyo.
STAT. § 22-25-102(d) (1977). See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 121.035(2) (1974).
158. This practice is probably permitted under the present statute. WYO. STAT. §
22-25-102(d) (1977).
159. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. §§ 121.035(2 and 121.025 (1974). It is questionable whether
such a practice is presently permitted in Wyoming. WYo. STAT. § 22-25-102(d) (1977).
160. This was a federal restriction existing in 1972. See Pipefitters Local Union No. 562
v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
161. WYo. STAT. § 22-25-102(a) may reach this activity. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 55,
§ 7 (1974).
162. As a result of this ambiquity, otherwise permissible corporate expression may be
precluded. Cf. Wood, supra note 106, at 776.
154.
155.
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Optional Regulatory Schemes
As noted above, the present Wyoming statutory provision prohibiting corporate expression in referenda, initiatives and other ballot issues is unconstitutional. However,
there exist essentially three different types of regulatory
systems that might be investigated by the Wyoming State
Legislature: the state-funded system, a limitation or ceiling
on expenditures and contributions and a disclosure system.
The state-funded system, I 3 attempts to provide the information and analysis which the open exchange of political views
would normally provide. The process associated with this
system is at least simple in theory. The proposition to be
16
presented to the voters is phrased, either by a state officer
or the proponent of the measure.'6 5 Arguments are then for66
mulated by the proponent and opponent of the measure.
At this point, a financial analysis may be added, formulated
by and at the initiative of the state. 67 The voters are then
provided with a pamphlet incorporating the measure, the
arguments in favor and against it, as well as the financial
analysis, if provided by the state.1 6 s
As the state-funded system contemplates excluding any
other organized publicity with regard to the measure in question, 169 the state or the involved parties' argument and
analysis will serve as the only organized means of persuasion
in the referendum. Such a system is arguably unconstitutional in light of the FirstNationalBank of Boston case, as
the system may ultimately work to deprive the electorate of
information regarding the measure. This may occur because
the system has a very definite tendency to over-simplify the
rationale for a given measure. 70 As groups may differ in
their reasons for supporting or opposing a measure, this system assumes a unitary articulation of interests, both pro and
con, which simply may not exist. 7 ' Presumably, if agree163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See,
See,
See,
See,
See,
See,

169.

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.03(A) (Baldwin 1974) as interpreted in State
v. Cleveland - Cliffs Iron Co., 79 Abs. 232, 152 N.E.2d 1 (App. Ct. 1958), lateroverruled by State v. Cleveland - Cliffs Iron Co., 169 O.S. 42, 157 N.E.2d 331 (1959).
Cf CorporateContributionsto Ballot-Measure Campaigns,supra note 93, at 787-88.
Cf King, supra note 3, at 864, in the context of issues important to the corporation
and not the candidate.

e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3519.19 (Baldwin 1974).
MICH. STAT. § 168.474 (1975).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3519.19 (Baldwin 1974).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-11a-1 to 20-11a-5 (1975).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-la-6 (1975).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-1la-7 (1975). Only the number specified by statute

are prepared.

170.
171.
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ment cannot be reached by two parties wishing to represent
a respective side, the choice of argument is left to the state
officer charged with preparation of the publicity pamphlet.' 72
The state's involvement in the formulation of the
arguments is certainly suspect under the principles enunciated in the FirstNationalBank of Boston case. Additionally, if corporations are excluded from participation in the
mechanism contemplated by the state-funded system, the
system is constitutionally deficient, as it represents an attempt by the state to choose for the electorate.
Even if the corporation is not excluded from participating in the state-funded mechanism and is further permitted to engage in organized publicity outside of the pamphlet, a state-funded system is still questionable constitutionally, as it may result in the state, through the auspices of
the state enforcement officer, selecting and impliedly giving
greater weight to the expression of that group or person
selected to represent either the proponent or opponent of the
measure. Finally, the state-funded measure does not represent a viable legislative option, as mechanically it may simply provide too little opportunity for the views on the
measure to be expressed. 73 As a consequence, it is submitted
that the state-funded system, though laudable in its intent,
is too restrictive upon the free flow of information to which
the electorate is entitled in referenda, initiatives and other
ballot issues.
Many states have enacted statutes which place limitations or ceilings on the amount which an individual or corporation may contribute or expend in a given election."' The
limitation system sought to encourage wide-spread small
contributions and thus induce participation. 7 ' The United
States Supreme Court in the case of Buckley v. Valeo 76 was
faced with the question of the constitutionality of federal
limitations or ceilings on the expenditures and contributions
which could be made by individuals in the nomination and
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

This would seem to be the effect of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3519.19 (Baldwin 1974).
Cf First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra note 7, at 1423-24.
LIaRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 63.
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra note 7, at 1423, n. 29 and 30; see,
generally, the remarks of Fleishman, supra note 114, 352-69 and Nicholson, supra
note 114, at 819-21 stressing the need for access by lesser-endowed groups.
Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 83.
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election of federal representatives. 1 7 The Buckley case was
directed at restrictions which might be put upon a natural individual or groups of individuals, rather than corporations.
Indeed, the Act examined in the Buckley case had specific
provisions which prohibited any corporate contributions. 178
However, in view of the Court's holding in the FirstNational Bank of Boston case, it should be anticipated that the
same constitutional objections which were applicable to restrictions on individual contributions and expenditures in
the election and nomination of federal officials would
likewise be impermissible with regard to corporate expenditures or contributions in ballot issues. The Buckley Court
found the limitation or ceiling on expenditures by individuals to be constitutionally impermissible, while upholding
the constitutionality of a similar limitation or ceiling upon
contributions to a candidate.'
Within the Buckley context, the Court viewed a contribution as those funds, services, gifts, loans, or deposits of
anything of value which were given to a candidate or to a
committee authorized by the candidate to accept contributions on his behalf.'80 Expenditures were viewed by the
Buckley Court as those funds which, though spent on a
specific identifiable candidate, were not made directly to the
candidate or a committee authorized to accept contributions
on the candidate's behalf."8 ' Initially, it is questionable
whether the expenditure-contribution dichotomy has any
meaning in the context of a referendum, initiative or other
ballot issue.
As noted in the discussion regarding state-funded
systems, it may well be constitutionally impermissible for
the state to designate a certain group or person as either a
proponent or opponent of a ballot issue. Thus, in practical
terms, expenditures may be equivalent to contributions
when those terms are used in the context of a referendum.
177.
178.
179.

180.
181.

Id.
This includes as well expenditures; see Appendix, ld. at 196-197.
Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 83, at 143. It must be recognized that an expenditure
"controlled by or coordinated with the candidate and his campaign' will be
categorized as a contribution and, thus, subject to permissible limitation. Id. at
46-47.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 39-40.
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Accordingly, it is arguable that the state may not impose a
limitation per se on corporate expenditures or contributions
made for the purposes of influencing a ballot issue.
Although the state may not permissibly prescribe a
limitation on expenditures or contributions per se, it is certainly arguable that the state may impose limitations on expenditures by requiring the approval of a given percentage
of the shareholders before such expression can be made. Certainly such a requirement would be in accord with the majority's decision in the FirstNational Bank of Boston case,
in that the purpose of the regulation is clearly the protection
of minority and non-consenting shareholders. 182 Such a
regulation is not over-broad or under-broad given the state's
permissible requirement that certain percentages of the
shareholders must consent when the articles of incorporation are amended and other significant acts are taken by the
corporation. 8 " Similarly, restrictions which would limit corporate expression to a certain amount of stated capital or
other measure of corporate worth might well be permissible.
However, it should be noted that the limitation would apply
only to corporations incorporated under Wyoming law or authorized to do business in Wyoming.
The state may arguably legislate another type of system
by which the rights of non-consenting or dissenting shareholders are protected. At least two methods have been proposed: (1) a notice system which would alert the shareholders
as to those corporations which would express themselves in
referenda, and (2) a check-out or check-in system that would
return to dissident or non-consenting stockholders a proportionate share of the cost of the corporation's expression.",
The notice proposal has largely been rejected in theory and
practice, as it would place too great a burden upon the
dissenting stockholder in terms of lost investment opportunities. 8 ' Most commentators have advocated the checkout or check-in system as the most effective means of permitting corporate expression without infringing upon minority
182.
183.
184.
185.

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra note 7, at 1424.
WYo. STAT. §§ 17-1-301 through 302 (1977).
The Constitutionalityof the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions, 42 U. CHi. L.R. 148, 157-159 (1974).
t
Id.
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shareholders' rights.' 86 In principle, the check-out system
allows each shareholder who does not wish the corporation
to engage in political expression the right to withhold that
portion of the total amount to be expended by the corporation equal to his proportionate share of the total outstanding
stock of the corporation. Under the check-out system, shareholders who do not affirmatively assert their opposition to
the proposed corporate expression are presumed to consent
to it. The check-in system, conversely, presumes that the
shareholder who indicates no preference dissents from the
proposed corporate expression.
However, there are two obstacles to the implementation
of this proposal: administrative costs and the free-rider problem.' If the cost of administering such a system is too high,
the financial burden on the corporation would essentially
preclude its expression. While the administrative costs of administering such a system for a small or closely-held corporation would not be prohibitive, the same could not be said for
large, publically-held corporations that might otherwise be
doing business in Wyoming. Likewise, it has been argued
that shareholders who either request rebates under the
check-out system or who do not consent to the expenditure
or contribution through a check-in system would ultimately
decrease the utility of the expression for those consenting
stockholders, resulting in the denial of corporate expression."' However, absent a clear showing that such a system
would effectively preclude corporate expression, it is submitted that the means are reasonably drawn so as to minimize
any abridgement of corporate expression in referenda, initiatives and other ballot issues.
The final regulatory system is one which requires
disclosure of all expenditures or contributions which exceed
a given amount.1 89 This system assumes that recognition of
the source of the information is as important as a substantive understanding of that information. The disclosure
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id
Id
Id at 155.
Wyoming has a disclosure system presently for expenditures and contributions
made to candidates. WYo. STAT. § 22-25-106. There appears to be no disclosure requirements for those making expenditures to promote a candidate when such expenitures are not controlled by or coordinated with the candidate or his committee.
Examples of far more comprehensivel disclosure systems abound. See, generally,
LIRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 63.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss2/4

36

Murdock and Murdock: Corporate Expression in Wyoming Ballot Issues, Referenda and Init

1979

CORPORATIONS AND REFERENDA

485

system has a professedly deterrent effect that has been demonstrated in California ballot issues. 9 ' The corporation is
theoretically deterred from participation because of both
possible stockholder dissent and adverse electoral results
due to its contribution.' 9 However, the reaction to corporate
expenditures or contributions may well depend on the timing
of the disclosure. If the required disclosure comes before the
election, the system may well preclude or reduce spending
1 92
through the corporation's fear of adverse voter reactions.
However, if the required disclosure comes after the election,
the system may simply deter corporate expression that
might otherwise be objectionable to shareholders. The Buckley Court upheld the constitutionality of disclosure provisions, expressly recognizing the function such disclosures
played in the dissipation of electorate cynicism and distrust. 19 3 Thus, disclosure of corporate expenditures or con-

tributions may serve as the most effective and yet constitutionally permissible means of regulating corporate expression in referenda, initiatives and other ballot measures.
If the Wyoming State Legislature determines that corporate expression should be regulated in referenda, initiatives and other ballot measures, it should adopt a
disclosure system that requires disclosure of corporate expenditures and contributions prior to the actual election. If
further regulation is felt necessary, the Wyoming State
Legislature should investigate the costs associated with a
check-out or check-in system. If those costs are not prohibitive, an appropriate legislative finding should be made and
such a system adopted. Should a check-out or check-in
system prove to be infeasible and further regulation be
deemed necessary, it is submitted that amendment of the
Wyoming Business Corporation Act to require approval of
two-thirds of the total shareholders before any corporate expenditures in referenda, initiatives or other ballot issues
could be made is constitutionally permissible. Other measures aimed at limiting the total expenditure through restriction on the amount spent to a proportion of some meaCf. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra note 7, at 1424, n. 32; Corporate
Contributions to Ballot-Measure Campaigns, supra note 93.
191. Brown v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 509, 96 C1. Rptr. 584, 487 P.2d 1224, 1231-33
(1971); see Ferman, supra note 71, at 27; King, supra note 3, at 868.
192. Idi
193. Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 83, at 83.
190.
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sure of corporate liquidity are constitutionally questionable,
but are certainly far more desirable than any attempt at prohibition of corporate expression.
PermissibleRegulation of CorporateExpression
In CandidateElections
Unlike the referendum, initiative or other ballot issue,
the candidate election is one in which a candidate is either
nominated or elected to office. While the decision in the First
National Bank of Boston case was limited to prohibitions
upon corporate expression in referenda, the case may also
have major ramifications for the permissible regulation of
corporate expression in candidate elections. While it is probable that the traditional threshold questions will also be
discarded when the restrictions on corporate expression are
examined in the context of the candidate election as opposed
to a referendum, the balancing test and the determinations
made pursuant to the test may well differ from that found in
the Court's decision in the First National Bank of Boston
case.
As discussed previously, the majority opinion in First
National Bank of Boston was not willing to extend the
freedom of press to include all corporate expressions as ad94
vocated by the Chief Justice in his concurring opinion.
Although Mr. Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion
maintained that "the First Amendment does not 'belong' to
any definable category of persons or entities: it belongs to all
who exercise its freedom,"1 95 the majority opinion carefully
distinguished the referendum from candidate elections. 9 '
Given the majority's careful distinguishing of referenda
from candidate elections and the view of the dissenting portion of the Court that the preservation of the electoral process is an interest which should be honored by the Court
even absent a strong showing of compelling need,'9 7 it must
be questioned whether the Court will as easily find that the
risk of corruption and the perception of corruption in can194.
195.
196.

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra note 7, at 1427-29.
Id at 1429.
Id at 1423. See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White, distinguishing the
threat ot corporate domination in referenda from that found in candidate elections,
albeit with less certitude than exhibited by Mr. Justice Powell. Id at 1433-34.
197. Id
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didate election is not a compelling state interest as it did in
the context of a referendum. Unlike the referendum, the
general election does not result in an immediate decision on a
specific issue, but rather culminates in a selection of a
representative who, in turn, will make further decisions on
behalf of the electorate. The possibility of corruption and the
electorate's basis for perceiving corruption as a result of corporate participation in a general election is far different from
what occurs in a referendum when the electorate decides the
political issue.
Having recognized the compelling interest of the state
to prevent corruption and mitigate against even the perception or appearance of corruption, 98 the Court might well be
expected to find permissible state prohibition of corporate
expression in candidate elections. Certainly, social science
research reveals that there is increasing cynicism of government and greater distrust of the role which special interests
play in governmental affairs."'
Perhaps the greatest challenge to a prohibition of corporate expression in candidate elections might come in an
over-breadth argument similar to that found in the FirstNational Bank of Boston case. As the Wyoming statutes permit
lobbying efforts by corporations, it can be argued, as was
done in the First National Bank of Boston case, that the
measure adopted-namely, prohibition-is overly broad to
accomplish the state's need to encourage electorate participation through the dissipation of political cynicism. As was
true in the First NationalBank of Boston case, the use of a
prohibition is questionable when the corporation is nonetheless permitted to lobby legislators out of the public scrutiny.
Without further restrictions upon the lobbying efforts of corporations, the better regulatory tool in a candidate election
may be that which would otherwise be found to be constitutionally permissible within the context of the referendum.
Assuming that the prohibition of corporate expression
in candidate elections is not desired, the same type of restrictions which are permissible with regard to regulation of corporate expression in referenda are arguably permissible in
198.

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra note 7, at 1423, 1433-34.

199.

INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH,

SUpra note 4, at 4.
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the regulation of corporate expression in candidate elections.
However, at least with regard to the limitations which may
be placed on contributions and expenditures, it certainly
may be argued that even the principles enunciated in the
First National Bank of Boston case might allow greater
restriction of corporate expression in candidate elections. As
a result of the Court's recognition of the States' need to
preserve the electoral process by encouraging participation
and preventing electorate distrust and cynicism, it may well
be argued that a limitation on corporate expenditures is constitutionally permissible. Certainly, such a measure falls far
short of a complete prohibition which, in certain circumstances, may still be permissible under the requirements of
the First National Bank of Boston case. As the state may
demonstrate through survey data, the electorate has become
increasingly distrustful of the role which special interests
play in governmental affairs. 00 The limitation on corporate
expenditures is a measure which ostensibly is directed at
alleviating electorate distrust which is derived from a
perceived corruption of the electorate process by corporations. While such a restriction would have to be carefully
drawn to meet the over-breadth objections previously
discussed, such a measure nonetheless may well pass constitutional muster.
CONCLUSION

After the United States Supreme Court's decision in the
FirstNational Bank of Boston case, it has become necessary
for the Wyoming State Legislature to re-examine the Wyoming Election Code. If no action is taken by the Legislature,
corporations are free to express themselves without restriction or disclosure in all referenda, initiatives and other ballot
issues conducted in the state. Should the Legislature feel
that regulation is necessary, it should adopt a comprehensive disclosure system. Should further regulation of corporate expression in referenda be deemed necessary, it is advisable that the Legislature pursue limitations on expenditures and contributions which are reasonably related to
the end that is sought legislatively-namely, the protection
of non-consenting stockholders.
200.

Id
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With regard to candidate elections, the Legislature may
well decide to leave its present prohibition on corporate expenditures and contributions in effect. Such a prohibition is
vulnerable to constitutional challenge, particularly the type
of over-breadth challenge which was made to the statutory
prohibition in the FirstNationalBank of Boston case. If the
Legislature pursues complete revision of the Wyoming Election Code, it should adopt disclosure provisions similar to
those that are enacted in the area of corporate expression in
referenda. Similarly, though some constitutional challenge
may be made to such restrictions, limitations on corporate
expenditures in candidate elections may be made, should the
Legislature find that such limitations will prevent corruption and alleviate perceived corruption by the electorate. In
the event that the Legislature finds that neither prohibition
nor limitation of expenditure is in the best interest of the
State, the laws governing corporate expression in referenda
and general elections should be integrated with corporate expression being no less restricted in one context than in
another.
With the United States Supreme Court's decision in the
First National Bank of Boston case, a new era in state
regulation of corporate expression has begun. While the
dimensions of the changes which will be brought by the
Court's decision are not clear, it is certain that greater
judicial scrutiny must be anticipated. Wyoming, like many
states, must re-examine its Election Code to bring the provisions of that Code into conformity with the dictates of the
First National Bank of Boston case. The choice of striking
the proper balance between the electorate's need for relevant
political information and the possible damage that could be
done to the electoral process by unbridled corporate expression is a difficult one. However, it is submitted that the
United States Supreme Court, with its decision in the First
NationalBank of Boston case, has decided that should it be
necessary to err, it will be on the side of the electorate's right
to know, for as was true for the Progressives, the inventors
of the referendum, faith is best placed in more democracy
and not less.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1979

41

